433 for Cert. Footnote 15 en banc are denied." The District Court therefore abused its discretion in imposing the tax itself. The case began in 1977, when a group of students and the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) sued the State of Missouri, federal agencies, and suburban districts around Kansas City on behalf of the district's students. (1990), is missing here. by the federal court and an order commanding the school district to impose the tax is but a convenient formalism where the court's action is predicated on elimination of state-law limitations on the school district's taxing authority. For this reason, I reject the artificial suggestion that the District Court may, by "prevent[ing] . Missouri v. Jenkins - 515 U.S. 70 Rule: In the first place, like other equitable remedies, the nature of a desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation. [495 493 Proceedings before the District Court continued during the appeal. Both Benson and the LDF employed numerous paralegals, law clerks, and recent law graduates, and the court awarded fees for their work based on market rates, again using current, rather than historic rates, in order to compensate for the delay in payment. Turning to the property tax increase, the Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument that a federal court lacks the judicial power to order a tax increase. 1651, 1666, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990), another case involving school desegregation, the Court held, "Even though a particular remedy may not be required in every case to vindicate constitutional guarantees, where (as here) it has been found that a particular remedy is required, the State cannot hinder the process by preventing a local government . As the Court chooses to discuss the question of future taxation, however, I must state my respectful disagreement with its analysis and conclusions on this vital question. (1963); Western Pacific Railroad Case, The application was returned as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. could not meet to fall on the State rather than interfere with state law to permit KCMSD to meet them. To put the matter another way, while the petition for rehearing is pending, there is no "judgment" to be reviewed. . Annual Subscription ($175 / Year). Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court. . Some of these improvements involved basic repairs to deteriorating facilities within the school system. 1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. had resigned their office no one remained on whom the mandamus could operate). Originally, the plaintiffs and the KCMSD school district wanted a "metropolitan plan," which would have included bus transfers to integrate and remedy the racial inequalities of inner-city and suburban schools. U.S. 248 103 For this reason, no order of taxation has ever been approved. U.S. 33, 47] [495 [495 1983 that the Kansas City Missouri School District managed a segregated public institution. Its observation was consistent with our cases concerning the scope of equitable remedies, which have recognized that "equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies." U.S. 33, 52] Missouri argued that these orders went beyond the court's authority. U.S. 33, 49] Ibid. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 491 U. S. 295. Proc. U.S. 124, 161 U.S. 688 402 2101(c) --which requires that a civil certiorari petition be filed within 90 days after the entry of the judgment below, and that any application for an extension of time be filed within the original 90-day period -- since, while the filing of a "petition for rehearing" under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40 tolls the running of the 90-day period, the filing of a "suggestion for rehearing in banc" under Rule 35 does not. As Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 3 Three months later, the District Court adopted a plan requiring $187,450,334 in further capital improvements. 46(c) (which provides the courts of appeals with authority to sit in banc) speak of rehearing in banc, not en banc. The Hancock Amendment thus prevents KCMSD from obtaining any revenue increase as a result of increases in the assessed valuation of real property. Unlike these other courts, the Eighth Circuit has endorsed judicial taxation, first in dicta from cases in which taxation orders were in fact disapproved. These cases hold that where there is no state or municipal taxation authority that the federal court may by mandamus command the officials to exercise, the court is itself without authority to order taxation. Throughout the remedial phase of the litigation, the KCMSD proposed ever more expensive capital improvements with the agreement of the plaintiffs, and the State objected. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education. Footnote 9 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. See 807 F.2d, at 684-685. I cannot agree, however, that we "stand on different ground when we review the modifications to the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals," ante, at 52. No. Compare Tr. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. As At FindLaw.com, we pride ourselves on being the number one source of free legal information and resources on the web. Stat. 402 The State's filing on its face did not exactly comport with any of these options. 349 [ The State filed a petition for certiorari within 90 days of the October 14, 1988, order, which was granted, limited to the question of the property tax increase. By the time of the order at issue here, the District Court's remedies included some "$260 million in capital improvements and a magnet-school plan costing over $200 million." ] "Magnet schools," as generally understood, are public schools of voluntary enrollment designed to promote integration by drawing students away from their neighborhoods and private schools through distinctive curricula and high quality. The State urges us to hold that the tax increase violated Article III, the Tenth Amendment, and principles of federal/state comity. One of the most troubling aspects of the Court's opinion is that discussion of the important constitutional issues of judicial authority to tax need never have been undertaken to decide this case. See id., at 191a. . The Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit enhancement of a fee award under 1988 against a State to compensate for delay in payment. In an action under 42 U.S.C. 317 You have successfully signed up to receive the Casebriefs newsletter. There is no allegation here, nor could there be, that the neutral tax limitations imposed by the people of Missouri are unconstitutional. Again hesitating to impose a tax increase itself, the court continued its injunction against the Proposition C rollback to enable KCMSD to raise an additional $6.5 million. Examination of the "long and venerable line of cases," ante, at 55, cited by the Court to endorse judicial taxation reveals the lack of real support for the Court's rationale. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to rule that KCMSD should be responsible for funding its share of the remedy. Rev. Though the majority in Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995), cited the earliest Supreme Court case as "Jenkins I," this Comment will designate the 1990 Supreme Court case as "Jenkins I" and the 1995 case as "Jenkins II" since the earlier case did not directly involve desegregation. for Cert. As a result, the District Court began to order remedial measures. 317 A group of local taxpayers (Clark Group) and Jackson County, Missouri, also appealed from an order of the District Court denying their applications to intervene as of right. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. It is true that in Milliken v. Bradley, ] Chief Judge Lay dissented from the resolution of the property tax issue. Appeals "did not require the District Court to reverse the tax increase that it had imposed for prior fiscal years," it "required the District Court to use the less obtrusive procedures beginning with the fiscal year commencing after the remand." 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 The following criteria must be considered in evaluating a request for attorneys' fees in a common fund.. Dowd v. City of L.A., Case No. We stated that the District Court could "require the Supervisors to exercise the We have no authority to extend the period for filing except as Congress permits. Michael D. Gordon and Lawrence A. Poltrock filed a brief for respondent American Federation of Teachers, Local 691. U.S. 1206 1987). First, in 1989, to address attorneys fees. ] The complaint originally alleged that the defendants had caused interdistrict segregation of the public schools. This final iteration of the Missouri v. Jenkins cases (this case is deemedMissouri v. Jenkins III) marks the end of the Courts involvement in the 18-year-long litigation. But this broad suggestion does not follow from the holding in Von Hoffman. We think this argument aims at the scope of the remedy rather than the manner in which the remedy is to be funded and thus falls outside our limited grant of certiorari in this case. Kalima JENKINS et al. BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and III of which O'CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., joined. No other order of the District Court was before the Court of Appeals. to Pet. Footnote * The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. In the first place, like other equitable remedies, the nature of a desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation. James Madison observed: "Justice is the end of government. U.S. 33, 34] The citizens who are taxed are given notice and a hearing through their representatives, whose power is a direct manifestation of the citizens' consent. The goals of court remediation of school segregation is to restore victims of discrimination to the position they would have been in but for the discrimination, and to eventually restore school control to the state and local authorities. Article I, 1, states that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." Sixty-seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, to Pet. Jenkins v. Missouri, 495 U.S. 33, 50-58 (1990). As a segregation remedial order, a federal court ordered Missouri (Defendant) to fund raises for teachers and staff in the Kansas City Metropolitan School District and to fund magnet programs. App. See Spallone v. United States, Other Circuits that have faced funding problems arising from remedial decrees have concluded that, while courts have undoubted power to order that schools operate in compliance with the Constitution, the manner and methods of school financing are beyond federal judicial authority. of Estimate v. Morris, The courts only question must be whether the state is intentionally discriminating against minorities. San Antonio Independent School Dist. . U.S. 33, 37]. Petitioner then challenged the courts authority to impose taxes under U.S. Const. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which SCALIA, J., joined, and in which REHNQUIST, C.J., joined in part, post, p. 491 U. S. 289. The Court of Appeals observed that the increases were designed to eliminate the vestiges of state-imposed segregation by improving the "desegregative attractiveness" of the district and by reversing "white flight" to the suburbs. The Court viewed this attempt to employ the writ of mandamus as a ruse to avoid the Eleventh Amendment's bar against exercising federal jurisdiction over the State. . an abstract question. [ They insist that the Eighth Circuit cannot, post hoc, amend its order to make it appear that it took an action which it never took. Opinion Announcement - April 18, 1990, Board of Commissioners of Knox County v. Aspinwall. U.S. 33, 47] This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. . The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed those orders. alteration of the rights [is] asked, and the finality of the court's first [ place in the KCMSD without a federal court order. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Law School Case Brief Missouri v. Jenkins - 495 U.S. 33, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) Rule: Remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited, and one of the most important considerations governing the exercise of equitable power is a proper respect for the integrity and function of local government institutions. 102 489 But as respondents point out, it has also been our consistent practice to treat suggestions for rehearing in banc presented to the United States Courts of Appeals that do not also include petitions for rehearing by the panel as not tolling the period for seeking certiorari. -281 (1977). v. Varsity Brands, Inc. Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., . 1983, the District Court found that the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD) and petitioner State had operated a segregated school system within the KCMSD. U.S., at 291 1988. 103 Cf. For reasons explained below, I agree with the Court that the Eighth Circuit's judgment affirming the District Court's direct levy of a property tax must be reversed. 705 (1867) (mandamus to state officials to collect a tax authorized by state law Use this button to switch between dark and light mode. denied, Regular adherence to published rules of procedure best promotes the principles of fairness, stability, and uniformity that those rules are designed to advance. . Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., I, 10, cl. North Carolina Bd. The order approving salary increases, which was grounded in improving the "desegregative attractiveness" of the KCMSD, likewise exceeded the District Court's admittedly broad discretion. of Education v. Doyle, [495 In fact, the taxation power is sought here on behalf of a remedial order unlike any before seen. The District Court next considered, as the Court of Appeals had directed, how to shift the cost of desegregation to KCMSD. Proc. On October 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals denied the petitions with an order stating as follows: "There are now three petitions for rehearing en banc pending before the Court. Thank you and the best of luck to you on your LSAT exam. to Pet. [495 KCMSD, which had been ordered by the Court to finance 25% of the plan, could not pay its share due to state constitutional and statutory provisions placing a cap . they are not unlimited," Whitcomb v. Chavis, U.S. 258, 261 Brief for Petitioner at 15-16. 433 The Sixth Circuit, in a somewhat different context, has recognized the severe intrusion caused by federal court interference in state and local financing. Had the court chosen, as the State argues, to allow the monetary obligations that KCMSD could not meet to fall on the State rather than interfere with state law to permit KCMSD to meet them, the implementation of the order might have been delayed if the State resisted efforts by KCMSD to obtain contribution. And the important effects of the taxation order discussed here raise additional federalism concerns that counsel against the Court's analysis. Id., at 121a. Id., at 20a. The District Court abused its discretion in imposing the tax increase, which contravened the principles of comity. For this reason, it is difficult to see the difference between an order to tax and direct judicial imposition of a tax. Ward, The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 28 Federal B. J. It found the District Court's pursuit of desegregative attractiveness in formulating a desegregation plan for the city district was beyond the scope of the District Court's remedial authority. (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). As part of its remedial order, for example, the District Court ordered the hiring of a "public information specialist," at a cost of $30,000. Over the years, it ordered a range of quality education programs, grants to schools, magnet schools, and capital improvement plans. was avowedly directed against the power of the States," Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., U.S. 267 was explained in Pink, "[a] timely petition for rehearing . [495 Const., Art. Mo. Milliken v. Bradley, [495 As I discuss below, I do not think this possibility is in reality a significant one. 491 U. S. 284-289. It determined that segregation had caused a systemwide reduction in student achievement in the city district's schools and ordered a wide range of remedial "quality education" programs for all students in the city district's schools. U.S. 218, 233 Does the Eleventh Amendment bar an enlarged fee award against a State to compensate late payment? (1973) (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 495 U. S. 53. to Pet. The court issued an order detailing a desegregation remedy and the financing necessary to implement it. A suggestion made to a United States court of appeals for a rehearing in banc . While a district court should not grant local government carte blanche, local officials should at least have the opportunity to devise their own solutions to such problems. 215 The Court held the subsequent limitation itself unconstitutional, a violation of the Contracts Clause. (1909); Graham v. Folsom, Pp. its own taxes. See, e. g., Londoner v. Denver, Missouri v. Jenkins No. Invested by whom? v. Rodriguez. 487 The Supreme Court ruled that while direct imposition of taxes is indeed beyond judicial authority, the district court could order the school district to levy the same tax: "Authorizing and directing local government institutions to devise and implement remedies not only protects the function of these institutions but, to the extent possible, also places the responsibility for solutions to the problems of segregation upon those themselves who have created the problem." With him on the brief for respondents Kalima Jenkins et al. [495 This is true as well of the problems of financing desegregation, for no matter has been more consistently placed upon the shoulders of local government than that of financing public schools. . Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. trict / distrikt/ n. ] United States v. County of Macon, It is true that the Court of Appeals went on "to consider the procedures which the district court should use in the future." Rather, it found only that the taxation orders were necessary to fund the particular remedy it had devised. Local government bodies in Missouri, as elsewhere, must derive their power from a sovereign, and that sovereign is the State of Missouri. Magnet schools, as the majority opinion notes, ante, at 40, n. 6, offer special programs, In Heine, the Court held that it had no equitable power to impose a tax in order to prevent the plaintiff's right from going without a remedy. *. The district court stated that it would "not U.S. 33, 67] Footnote 8 U.S. 33, 58] Rule App. (1980). The KCMSD plan adopted by the court provided that "every senior high school, every middle school, and approximately one-half of the elementary schools in the KCMSD will become magnet schools by the school year 1991-92." This is the attorney's fee aftermath of major school desegregation litigation in Kansas City, Missouri. There is no showing in this record that, faced with the revenue shortfall, the District Court gave due consideration to the possibility that another remedy among the "wide range of possibilities" would have addressed the constitutional violations without giving rise to a funding crisis. Pp. U.S. 816 (1979); Dayton Bd. Did the federal district court have the authority to impose the tax increase? [ . See App. (1977), we upheld a prospective remedial plan, not a "money judgment," ante, at 54, against a State's claim that principles of federalism had been ignored in the plan's implementation. U.S. 381 [495 , See id., at 1299 ("[W]e modify [the order's] future operation to more closely comport with limitations upon our judicial authority"); id., at 1318 ("We . Footnote 17 On September 16, 1988, the State filed with the Court of Appeals a document styled "State Appellants' Petition for Rehearing En Banc." Ferguson Reorganized School Dist. by Benna Ruth Solomon, Joyce Holmes Benjamin, and Andrew D. Hurwitz; and for Icelean Clark et al. Commissioners, 19 Wall. Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! Media. Rule App. Here, KCMSD was ready, willing, and, but for the operation of state law, able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights itself. Our statement in a case decided more than 100 years ago should apply here. 491 U.S. at 285. Footnote 12 Importantly, the District Court did not order the State to bus children from other school districts because the court did not find any interdistrict segregation violations. It is instead one that brings the weight of federal authority upon a local government and a State. Cf. Mo. The Court asserts that its understanding of Griffin follows from cases in which the Court upheld the use of mandamus to compel local officials to collect taxes that were authorized under state law in order to meet bond obligations. Indeed, while this case happens to arise in the compelling context of school desegregation, the principles involved are not limited to that context.